Abstract-Power systems face higher flexibility requirements from generation to consumption due to an increasing injection of non-controllable distributed renewable generation. Time-andLevel-of-Use is a recently proposed energy pricing scheme for Demand Response, designed for residential users and providing suppliers with robust guarantee on the consumption. We formulate the supplier decision as a bilevel, bi-objective problem optimizing for both financial loss and guarantee. A decomposition method is proposed, related to the ε-constraint and optimal value transformation. It allows for the computation of an exact solution by finding possible Pareto-optimal candidate solutions and then eliminating dominated ones. Numerical results on experimental residential power consumption data show the method effectively finds the optimal candidate solutions while optimizing costs only or incorporating risk-aversion at the lower-level.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The last decades have marked power systems and markets by a decentralization and unpredictability of energy generation, with higher penetration of wind and solar power [1] and the increased ease of automated information exchange between production, transmission, distribution and consumption agents. We consider an energy supplier serving one customer (residential or industrial) with the possible load levels within a time frame t being a random variable X t with an associated probability distribution known from the two players over the discrete set of consumption scenarios Ω. In this model, neither of the user or supplier decisions influence the load distribution. The contributions of this article are the development of a variant of the Time-and-Level-of-Use (TLOU) tariff introduced in [2] and developed in [3] , the formulation of the price-setting problem under this scheme from a supplier perspective as a bilevel bi-objective problem, the study of the structure of the game and feasible solutions for both players and the design of two efficient algorithms based on inverse optimization and the optimal value mapping and to solve the problem by finding the complete set of Pareto-efficient points.
Extensive investigations have been pursued in demand forecasting [4] , but also on the variation of demand with prices, encapsulated by the concept of demand-price elasticity [5] . This approach however requires strong assumptions on user behavior and utility function as developed in [6] , [7] . User-side multi-objective approaches encapsulate total load satisfaction or dis-satisfaction and cost minimization as two conflicting objectives [8] . Bilevel optimization has been used for energy networks as developed in [9] and mentioned in [10] and [11] , to encapsulate utility-generators, user-utility interactions [12] [13] , or define robust formulations of unit commitment and optimal power flow [14] . In [15] , a framework is defined for demand response applied to the real-time market. A Time-of-Use pricing policy is designed in [16] as a bilevel problem for competing retailers targeting residential users. The Time-of-Use policy is defined for each end user by the retailer. In this paper, we consider the same two-player setting of an energy supplier facing one energy demand agent (end-user, smart building or microgrid operator). A fix-and-optimize framework procedure is presented in [17] and applied to a long-term Unit Commitment problem, where fixed variables yielding a restricted and easier problem to solve. We develop a related approach, fixing hard-to-solve decisions, namely the bilevel lower level decision. [18] develops an inverse optimization framework to solve a single-leader, multiple followers bilevel problem for mobile network pricing. The approach developed here also leverages the lower level structure to characterize necessary optimality conditions. Multi-objective bilevel optimization problems have been reviewed in [19] . The study of the multiobjective bilevel problem in [20] defines necessary optimality conditions for bilevel problems with multiple objectives at the higher level and a single objective at the lower one by reducing the lower level to its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition, while [21] derives other necessary conditions from the proof of an equivalence with a single objective problem. The ε−constraint method is a solution concept turning all objectives but one into constraints. In the bi-objective case, one objective is formulated as a constraint to remain below a limit ε used as upper bound on the second objective. This approach can be used to compute all efficient points, including discrete fronts [22] which corresponds to the structure of our problem. Computing methods for bilevel problems with multiple objectives at the upper level are developed in [23] , based on different scalarization and weighted-sum techniques of the multiple objectives while [24] develops a reduction to a single-level, mixed-integer multi-objective problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces a variant of the TLOU energy tariff policy developed in [3] , section III defines the interests and objectives of both the energy supplier and consumer in such framework, section IV introduces the bilevel problem corresponding to the optimization for both players of their respective objectives. Section V develops properties derived from the structure of the problem and introduces an algorithm for its resolution. Section VI details the results of the optimization with user load distributions based on historical consumption data of a pilot R&D house. Section VII concludes on the main theoretical and practical results of this work.
II. TLOU PRICING TLOU pricing was initially discussed in [25] and developed in [3] . It is a pricing model built upon the Time-of-Use (TOU) implemented on several jurisdictions and for which the energy price is fixed by intervals throughout the day. TLOU extends TOU by allowing users to book capacity to the supplier. Energy prices still depend on the time frame within the day, but also on the capacity booked by the user. This pricing therefore requires a three-step decision making between the two agents (supplier and consumer):
1) The supplier sends the pricing information to the user.
2) The user books a capacity to the supplier for the time frame before a deadline. If no capacity has been booked, the Time-of-Use pricing is used. 3) After the time frame, the total cost is computed depending on the energy consumed and booked capacity.
The price structure is composed of three elements:
• A booking fee K. For a booked capacity c, the user will pay a booking cost of K · c.
• A lower energy price π L (c), decreasing with the booked capacity in a step-wise fashion • A higher energy price π H (c), increasing with the booked capacity in a step-wise fashion
In the initial version of the pricing proposed in [3] , the part of the energy consumed above the capacity is paid at the higher tariff while the rest is paid at the lower tariff. Considering that most power systems try to prevent over-consumption or unplanned excess consumption, we introduce a variant where the whole energy consumed is paid at the lower tariff if it is less or equal to the capacity, and the higher tariff otherwise, see (1) . If the consumption over the time frame remains below the booked capacity, the effective energy price is given by the lower tariff curve while if the consumption exceeds the booked capacity, the energy price is given by the higher tariff. The total price paid by the user with a booked capacity c and a consumption X for a time frame is:
the Time-of-Use price at the time frame of interest t. The TLOU is designed for the day-ahead market, with both the pricing setting and the capacity being chosen ahead of the consumption day [3] . It can however be adjusted to other markets [26] . The agent managing the TLOU pricing can also extend the possible settings by decoupling the time spans of one price setting choice with the time span for capacity booking. For instance, a price setting can be chosen by the utility for the week, while the booking of capacity occurs the day before the consumption.
The user reduces their total energy cost by a simple load planning; from the supplier perspective, TLOU brings a guarantee on the consumption, in the sense that load deviations from the booked capacity are paid for by the user. An underconsumption x u below c is paid by the excess booking fee K(c − x u ) while an over-consumption x o is paid by the difference between higher and lower tariffs
. Therefore, TLOU offers robustness of generation planning decisions by compensating costs due to forecast errors. We introduce the concept of guarantee loss function L G the supplier co-optimizes with its financial loss. We consider the guarantee loss as decreasing with the booked capacity, therefore considering under-booking (therefore under-estimations of loads) as more critical for the grid than over-booking.
III. USER AND UTILITY DECISIONS AND OBJECTIVES
This section introduces the decision variables of both the utility (supplier) and the user in the bilevel framework associated with the TLOU, along with the user objective and behavior model and the two objective functions of the utility.
A. User Financial Loss and Behavior Models
The user objective is to maximize the difference between the total energy costs within the program and what it would have been without it. The expected cost of the baseline does not depend on user decisions and can be computed for a given time frame t as:
Where π 0 (t) is the price fixed by the utility for the time frame t in the Time-of-Use pricing scheme. Given lower and higher prices at a booked capacity c, π L (c) and π H (c) respectively and a booking cost K, the scenarios ω ∈ Ω are split between under-and over-consuming compared to the capacity: any capacity c booked by the user creates two partitions of this set defined as:
The user expected cost for this booked capacity is given by:
Since the consumption on a given time frame is a random variable, a rational user would book a capacityĉ optimizing their expected total energy costs:
However, several variations of the user behavior can be defined and used instead of a rational cost minimization to encounter for several phenomena. Stochastic users maintain a probability distribution of booked capacity given the price structure. Risk-averse users would penalize solutions with probability of higher costs such as in chance-constrained models [27] , or a higher variability in the total cost over possible scenarios [28] . We propose a risk-aversion model for the user depending on the difference between higher and lower tariffs at any given capacity.
B. Utility Financial Loss
The utility designing the program creates an incentive for users to book capacity. The difference between the user expected gain and the baseline is always positive. If it was not the case, the user would not book capacity, in which case the cost is exactly the baseline. If the user expected cost for a given capacity is equal to the expected cost of the baseline or to expected cost for any other capacity, the lower level cost minimization problem is not well posed and the utility has to rely on user behavior model as developed in III-A. The financial loss is therefore defined as the difference of expected profit between the baseline and the TLOU program. This quantity is always positive, and minimized by the utility.
C. Utility Guarantee Gain
The central advantage of the TLOU policy on the utility's side is the gain of information on the consumption and a guarantee on this consumption level through the mechanisms preventing over-and under-booking capacity. This guarantee corresponds to financial gains on the generation, since the predictability of the demand can reduce the difference (either positive or negative) between day-ahead planned generation and actual consumption. Three parameters driving the value of gaining guarantee are therefore planned generation marginal cost, unplanned power cost and costs of excess power. Without the exact values for these functions, the guarantee gain can be used to represent the grid operator's interest. The booking fee and higher tariff create a guarantee on the information gained on the user behavior: the user will be paying through the booking fee or the higher tariff their over-or underestimation of the consumption. An increased booked capacity yields higher needs for the user to book as accurately as possible because the two cost factors are increased. Indeed the booking cost increases proportionally with the booked capacity and the difference between lower and higher tariffs increases in a monotonic, step-wise fashion. We propose the use of the survival function [29] of the hourly consumption distribution as the guarantee loss function, defined as follows:
Where P Ω denotes the probability over the whole set Ω. It is monotonic decreasing and adapts the guarantee objective to the probability distribution of the loads. If the utility optimized only on the guarantee function, they would favor a user choice at the maximal consumption level. This objective is therefore conflicting with the utility financial loss defined in section III-B.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The set of possible consumption levels Ω is known as well as the corresponding probability distribution. Given this distribution and the objectives defined in section III, the bilevel bi-objective optimization problem can be formulated as:
Constraints (10) (11) and (12) represent the higher-level problem solved by the energy utility, while (13) refers to the problem solved by the user. The typical min-max structure of non-cooperative games can be observed. π H (c), π L (c) respectively refer to the higher, respectively lower tariff at the booked capacity c. Φ represents the set of feasible tariffs as described by constraints (16 -22) . Price consistency can be ensured by further constraints, making the higher tariff increasing with the booked capacity and the lower tariff decreasing:
Furthermore, constraints (14-15) can be tightened to ensure a strict monotony of the price steps, such that each step of the lower tariff, is smaller than the previous one by a constant quantity ∆ L min , the same constraint can be applied to the higher tariff with a minimal positive difference of ∆
Finally, both the higher and lower tariff vectors are bounded by the baseline Time-of-Use price π 0 :
It must be noted thatĉ is one valid solution to the maximization lower-level problem. If different capacities yield the same expected lowest cost for the user, which will be chosen is not deterministic but relies on user behavior assumptions. [30] and [9] review different choices at the lower-level in the case of multiple solutions with the optimal value and their consequences on the feasibility and of bilevel problems. This work adopts an approach forcing determinism by ensuring uniqueness of the lower-level optimum in higher-level constraints, such that arg max c L F (c) is always a singleton.
Chapter 3 of [9] details three approaches for the resolution of bilevel problems by a reduction to single-level optimization. The optimal value transformation, one of these approaches, consists in adding an equilibrium constraint:
With f the lower level objective, x the decision variables of the upper level, y the decision variables of the lower level and g the inequality constraint of the lower level. The lower-level problem can be simplified based on some considerations: Proposition IV.1. The optimal booked capacity for a user belongs to a finite and known set of capacitiesŜ c , defined as:
With C L , C H the sets of capacities defining the steps of the lower and higher price curve respectively, Ω the set of possible values of total consumed load or consumption scenarios.
Proof. The user objective function is a sum of a booking cost and expected electricity cost. The booking cost is linear with the booked capacity, with a positive slope equal to the booking fee. The expected electricity cost is piecewise constant with the booked capacity, discontinuities occur at steps of both of the price curves because of the π L and π H prices and at possible load levels because of the transfer of a load from Ω + to the Ω − set. This can be highlighted using the indicator functionassociated with the two sets.
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The expression of the user expected cost becomes:
The sum of the two terms is therefore piecewise linear with a positive slope. On any interval between the discontinuity points, the optimal value lies on the lower bound, which can be any point of C L , C H , Ω or 0.
Proposition IV.2. The set of optimal candidates can be restricted to
Proof. Let C(c) be the user cost for a booked capacity andc such thatc ∈ C H andc / ∈ {0} ∪ C L ∪ Ω. The higher tariff levels are monotonously increasing, let ε > 0 small enough such that:
The last condition guarantees there is no load value in the [c − ε,c + ε] interval and can also be expressed in terms of the two load sets split by the capacity:
Then if such ε exists, we find that:
The discontinuity is therefore always positive and cannot be a candidate for optimality.
As a result, the guarantee function, which only depends on the booked capacity, takes values in the set defined as:
Finally, we can define the assignment matrices for both the lower and higher tariff, M L , M H respectively, with following dimensions and definition:
corresponds to jth price step 0 otherwise
The mapping from S c to π H , π L is surjective since each capacity level corresponds to exactly one price for each curve.
The formulation of the user expected cost thus becomes for the booked capacity c k , k ∈ S c :
The equilibrium constraint can be formulated for a chosen preferred capacity l ∈ S c , the user expected total cost with this capacity booked must be smaller than the expected cost for any other booked capacity k ∈ S c by at least a difference δ. The rationale for defining a minimal difference δ is detailed in section V.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION APPROACH For a given booked capacity, both the guarantee function and lower-level problem are fixed. The algorithm presented below leverages this fact to reduce the problem at the higher level to a finite sequence of easily solvable problems. Each of the sub-problems becomes a single-level, single-objective linear optimization problem. A sub-problem of the bilevel is defined at each c k ∈ S c as:
This formulation restricts the domain to the region in which c k is the optimal capacity to book for the user, while minimizing the financial loss. The guarantee loss does not change, as it is fixed by c k . We can derive from Proposition IV.2 that the number of sub-problems to solve is at most |S c \{0}| = |S c | − 1.
Constraint (32) ensures that the user's expected cost is strictly lower when booking the capacity c k than in any other choice. This makes the decision of rational users deterministic, removing the need to rely on optimistic, pessimistic or stochastic decision models of the lower level. In practice, strict inequalities lead to non-existent optimal solutions, the formulation is changed to ensure a minimal difference δ in total cost compared to any other solution.
Since monetary values use a limited number of digits, δ can be chosen as the currency resolution (e.g. 1ct) or as the minimal perceived difference in value for users. With a different perspective, the difference in preference for a solution can be chosen as proportional to the risk of this solution. This notion of risk can be described using different metrics, a quantity capturing it is the difference between the higher and lower prices at the given capacity. The solution then has to be better than any other one by a difference of
. This does not otherwise affect the linearity of the problem to solve at each capacity.
The purpose of the sequential resolution is to compute all feasible points of the discrete Pareto front. Starting at the maximum capacity in S c , we solve the corresponding sub-problem and then iterate at successively lower capacity candidates. If at one candidate, the resulting financial loss is lower than any point reached before, the new solution belongs to the Pareto front. Otherwise, given that L G is monotonic decreasing, the value is greater or equal to previous steps, the solution is dominated and can be discarded. Furthermore, the lowest financial loss previously found is an upper bound for any new candidate of the Pareto front.
S c is considered in Algorithm 1 as a sorted array of capacities rather than a set, with S c [0] = 0. The algorithm does not compute the optimal point for this capacity, since this is the baseline with the worst guarantee loss and the best financial loss.
Proposition V.1. Algorithm 1 finds all and only efficient points.
Proof. The set of candidates is S c , which contains all possible Pareto-efficient points, as laid out in IV.2. If a point is infeasible (i.e. o k is returned as false), it is trivially not optimal. Otherwise, a first case is that there exists a point already in the Pareto set with the same guarantee loss function. In that case, the point retained is the one with the lowest financial loss value, and the financial loss bound l F is updated accordingly. The second possible case is that the guarantee loss function is strictly higher than all points already in the Pareto front, since
while k > 0 do 6:
if o k then 9:
end if
18:
end if 19 :
end while 21: return Pareto 22: end function we evaluate candidate in decreasing c (increasing L G ) order. In that case, the candidate is efficient only if it improves the financial loss, and is therefore better than the bound l F .
The SolveBoundedLP function in Algorithm 1 takes a capacity as argument that should be maintained as the optimal booking choice for the user, the current lower bound l F on the financial loss and the difference δ to maintain between the user utility at c k and any other choice. It returns a potential candidate p k , a boolean indicating whether this candidate may be added to the Pareto front o k . It can be noted that the initial solution of the primal problem is infeasible from the constraint (37) . The costliest part of the algorithm consists in solving the LPs. Since all candidates are evaluated, this can be carried out in parallel as laid out in Algorithm 2, solving all sub-problems for c ∈ S c , and then filtering dominated points. The best-found solution cannot be used directly to reject a candidate during or right after their evaluation since it may not be computed before this candidate.
None of the iterations of the parallel loop manipulates data shared with any another, each only maps the (k, c k ) to the corresponding p k , the only synchronization happens to insert the value in the candidate set cand, which is maintained sorted. In the second phase, the same reverse filtering as in the sequential version can be used to remove dominated points.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS ON CONSUMPTION DATA
Practical results of the policy can be observed based on historical consumption data measured on a pilot house, computing optimal price settings on the utility side and corresponding user booked capacity. The instantaneous consumption was measured every two minutes during 47 months on a residential building by EDF [31] , the data are hosted and available on 
if o k then 7: cand ← InsertSorted(cand, p k ) for k ∈ {|S c |..2} do 13:
end if 23: end for 24: return Pareto 25: end function [32] . Only the active power is used in this study. Since the focus is the energy consumed within a given time frame, the instantaneous power can be averaged over hours, yielding the energy in kW · h and avoiding issues of missing measures, frequent during the measurements observed in the data set. The average of the hourly consumption over all days of the data set was computed, consumption peaks can be observed in the early morning (7AM, 8AM) and evening (19AM -21AM). Computations, data processing and visualization are performed using Julia [33] and matplotlib [34] . The discretization of the continuous energy distribution is performed based on a Gaussian Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) defined in [35] and [36] , computed with [37] . The levels of discretization should not be set on the distribution peaks, but at slightly higher levels, we therefore define {x ω , ω ∈ Ω}, the set of loads iff x ω is an inflexion point on a decreasing portion of the curve:
The first and second derivatives are obtained using forward differentiation implemented in [38] . The number of levels can be adjusting by modifying the bandwidth of the Kernel Density. On the average consumption data at 7AM, a bandwidth of 0.05kW · h yields 20 levels while a bandwidth of 0.1kW · h yields 9 levels. The resulting levels for a bandwidth of 0.1kW ·h are presented in Figure 1 , the discrete probability set corresponding to these levels is presented in Figure 2 .
For each k ∈ S c , the sub-problem model is built using JuMP [39] and solved with the CLP solver [40] . With 9 discrete probability levels, 9 steps of both the lower and higher tariff Figure 3 , along with the user expected costs with the booked capacity. The capacity c 14 = 3.47kW · h belongs to the set {x ω , ω ∈ Ω} while c 18 = 4.51kW · h belongs to the steps of the lower level tariff C L . The user expected cost curves confirm that for the solution chosen by the utility, any booked capacity will be more expensive than the chosen c k by a difference δ. It can also be noticed that the baseline (c = 0) is always the limiting factor of the equilibrium constraint, the financial loss L F is therefore always δ, making all points dominated except the baseline and the highest capacity feasible point. This is verified by analyzing the dual of the equilibrium constraints, all being null except the dual of the comparison with the baseline which always has a value of 1: the constraint is directly formulated with the expression of the financial loss, its variation impacts the objective directly. Incorporating risk penalty allows us to build a Pareto-front, since the difference in financial loss δ+β(π H (c)−π L (c)) penalizes higher capacities. With the same configuration as the previous fixed-difference experimentation and using values (δ = 0.0001, β = 0.005), we obtain the same set of 5 candidate points out of 18 points of S c . The discrete Pareto front is computed, two dominated points are identified and filtered out as shown in Figure 4 . The Utopia point is also shown in the figure. The ideal L F value is 0, comparable to the baseline at c = 0, and the ideal guarantee loss is also 0, for a capacity corresponding to max{x ω , ω ∈ Ω}. The worst feasible financial loss is computed with a modification of the problem:
s.t. cons.(12 − 13)
We obtain a Nadir point of (L F , L G ) = (1.6, 0.0), not displayed for readability issues. We then study the influence of (δ, β) on the Pareto front, as presented in Figure 5 .
VII. CONCLUSION
The TLOU policy was designed to allow users to reduce costs on their electricity bill, while helping the grid operator to gain predictability and guarantee on the demand in a flexible way. A bilevel approach was taken from the point of view of a power supplier facing users, optimizing both a guarantee on the consumption and a financial loss by anticipating a rational response from the user. The solution concept leverages a decomposition of the problem to compute Pareto optimality candidates, building a finite set of LPs to solve independently. We were then able to eliminate dominated points by a sequential check from the highest to lowest capacity. Future work will investigate the extension to multiple users under one pricing, mixed continuous-discrete distributions of loads and the effect of asymmetric information in the game. 
